Between veto and paralysis: the Security Council and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (2005–2025)

María Paula Ballesteros and Matías Mongan

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, one of the oldest and most deeply entrenched issues on the international agenda, reveals with particular clarity the limits of the multilateral system. Over more than seven decades—and especially visibly between 2005 and 2025—the Security Council has been unable to address the root causes of the conflict, constrained by the strategic alignments of the major powers.

This analysis, based on the Gate Center’s Security Council Index, shows a consistent pattern: humanitarian or operational resolutions move forward by consensus, while texts addressing substantive political issues—such as a permanent ceasefire, Jerusalem, settlements, or Palestinian membership—are systematically blocked, especially by the United States veto. This reproduces a logic observed in other conflicts: the Council manages crises but does not resolve conflicts.

Between 2005 and 2025, the Council’s behavior can be divided into three phases:

1. 2005–2014: reactive management focused on humanitarian consequences, exemplified by Resolution 1860 following “Operation Cast Lead.”
2. 2015–2022: a brief opening with Resolution 2334, quickly neutralized by the lack of implementation and the unilateral shift in U.S. policy.
3. 2023–2025: increased formal activity (more sessions, drafts, and resolutions such as 2728 and 2735) that does not alter the structural deadlock, remaining limited to humanitarian pauses, corridors, and reconstruction.

The analysis also examines the differentiated roles within the Council:

• The P5, whose veto power determines the boundaries of what is possible.

• The E-10, which gain relevance by producing technically refined drafts as long as they avoid sensitive terms.

• A Global South that pushes for greater accountability and more balanced representation, though without the capacity to alter the veto structure.

The authors argue that the Council’s crisis is not one of existence but of function. The body maintains its formal legitimacy but has lost political effectiveness. Action has shifted from ius ad bellum to ius in bello, giving rise to a reactive humanitarian diplomacy that manages harm but does not transform realities. The Israeli–Palestinian case encapsulates this paradox: a multilateralism that is procedurally active yet incapable of addressing the deep-rooted causes of violence.