Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy: A View from the Global South

Miriam Gomes Saraiva,Professor of International Relations, University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Rio de Janeiro

Although everyone expected that Donald Trump’s election as US president in November 2024 would bring changes in foreign policy and he announced this during the election campaign, no one imagined the extent of the change that is taking place.

In addition to the impact on US domestic policy – which will not be discussed here – Trump’s decisions and actions in international affairs have had long-term effects and results. These changes are mainly in the areas of multilateralism, security and international trade.

Historically, US foreign policy has not been continuous but has changed a few times in recent times, especially with alternating Democratic or Republican presidents. The presidential system per se and the role of the executive in foreign policy-making increase the possibility of foreign policy changes with presidential turnover. However, there was some consensus on foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, such as support for multilateralism. The United States encouraged the multilateral institutions of the liberal international order, finding in them a way to structure the post-Cold War order. Although there have been some obstacles when it comes to environmental issues, since the 1990s, international organisations have played an important role in both security and international economics.

In the field of international security, despite the oscillations and the fragmenting role of George W. Bush’s war on terror in the international order, the US alliance with European countries through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had continued, based on the large budgetary contribution and responsibility of the United States. This alliance was primarily aimed at containing possible Russian expansionism and dealing with conflict situations on the European continent, and secondarily at avoiding scenarios contrary to Western interests in the Global South.

In international economics, the United States has long championed liberalism and opposed proposals to regulate international trade. Its leaders have generally opposed protectionist behaviour and have used low trade tariffs as a factor in attracting trading partners and thereby extending US hegemony.

Donald Trump’s second election challenged these signs of continuity. It is true that Trump’s first presidency had an impact on the international order by weakening multilateralism and disrupting free trade negotiations, but, in his first term, the president faced resistance to the desired changes within his own political circle. His second presidency, however, does not follow the same pattern. The disorientation of the Democratic Party during the election campaign, coupled with Trump’s victory in swing states, gave him the legitimacy to rule with quasi-absolute power. This allowed him to challenge both the precepts and tradition of US foreign policy, centring his approach on the belief that, given America’s centrality in the world, it can impose on others as it sees fit. Moreover, Donald Trump concentrates virtually all decisions in the presidency and has not shown himself to follow any structured blueprint or train of thought.

Trump and multilateralism

Donald Trump is a great exponent of the so-called populist extreme right. The main foreign policy feature of this political current is anti-globalism. In it, Western civilisation is seen as a set of traditional ideas that are in danger of disappearing due to the lust for power of the bureaucratic apparatus of multilateral institutions. This bureaucracy would correspond to an international elite opposed to national values and which would control the speed of globalisation, compromising the exercise of state sovereignty. The attack on the defence of the environment is also part of this narrative. According to the President’s camp, those concerned about climate change would use this defence to achieve political goals and undermine state sovereignty. During Trump’s first term, multilateral institutions – in particular the Paris Agreement – felt the impact of the US withdrawal. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was paralysed, and during the Covid-19 pandemic, the US withdrew from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and earlier from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

Trump’s second term looks no different. In the first days of his second term, the US again withdrew from the Paris Agreement, the WTO and the WHO. It is worth noting that, in the face of the Trump administration’s increased import tariffs, the WTO does not have the resources to act as a restraining factor. As a result, its foreign policy agenda is progressively being defined outside multilateral international institutions.

Against a backdrop of conflict in Europe, the multilateral organisation that has felt the impact the most is NATO. It is not the first time that problems have arisen within the organisation, especially when it comes to the Americans’ long-standing demands that other members share its budget more equitably, which Trump has raised before. But in his second term, and with the worsening conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the rift between the US and Europe has intensified. Seeking a solution to the conflict in bilateral talks, leaving NATO and the EU out of the equation, and increasing demands for a sharing of its members’ financial responsibilities, have eroded their ability to act and caused Europeans to fear losing US protection. This concern is driving Europeans to consider an EU rearmament plan and to define its foreign policy directions on the basis of strategic autonomy.

Trump and international security

The US role as a guarantor of European security has also been questioned in the past. Historically, Republicans have favoured greater defence budget participation by NATO partners, and had adopted – with restraint – the policy practice known as American isolationism. In his first term, Trump tried his hand at isolationism, which materialised in the decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan. Relations with Vladimir Putin oscillated between rivalry and friendship.

In his new term there were ambiguous expectations about the profile Donald Trump would adopt. Since the election campaign, the President identified NATO as an ‘obsolete institution’, and sold the image that he would end the two major wars of the moment: Russia’s against Ukraine and Israel’s against the Palestinians in Gaza. Because of his isolationist image there were expectations that if elected, Trump would halt (or curtail) the support for Ukraine that had been offered by the Democratic administration of Joe Biden.

Once president, Donald Trump attempted to seek solutions outside multilateral frameworks in both conflicts. In the case of the war against Ukraine, there was a radical change in behaviour compared to Joe Biden’s administration. In the back-and-forth, the projects approved by the previous administration were maintained. However, in early March, Trump ordered the suspension of all military aid, proposing as a condition that Ukraine authorise US investment in the exploitation of strategic minerals on its territory. Days later, after the Ukrainian government accepted the US ceasefire proposal, aid was resumed. In practice, the supply of resources for Ukraine’s defence became more uncertain and the US government’s unconditional alliance with the country was broken.

In line with his contempt for multilateral institutions, Trump has established direct talks with Vladimir Putin and Volodimir Zelenski, sidelining NATO and the EU. Trump’s move weakens NATO, which has repercussions for US partner countries in the northern hemisphere. This policy could lead to the growth of an arms race or warmongering positions in the countries of the North. The European rearmament project, if implemented, will have to bring together 27 countries at a time when there are divergences within the political spectrum of the European Union, which is also witnessing the growth of actors politically aligned with the extreme right. This move transforms world geopolitics by placing Europe at the centre of global military disputes and negotiations.

Regarding the war itself, although peace may seem very distant, some steps are being taken to end the conflict (such as an initial ceasefire focused on infrastructure areas). Because Russia is a nuclear power, this is a difficult conflict to resolve fairly, and from the perspective of countries in the Global South, it is important to move toward peace—even without clear winners. This could reduce the risk of future confrontations, as well as favor a reduction in security spending.
If Donald Trump’s government manages to achieve a total ceasefire, it would meet an expectation that was raised upon his return to power by countries in the Global South, particularly those in the BRICS group. The need to end a war that affects multilateralism may seem more urgent to them than preventing Ukraine from suffering further losses.

In the case of the war between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza (following the Hamas attack in October 2023), Donald Trump’s involvement in the ceasefire shortly before taking office raised hopes of a resolution to the conflict. However, those hopes quickly faded. Trump’s unconditional support for Israel’s aggressive military operations reinforced the position of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Trump also mocked the tragedy by suggesting (in a frivolous video) that Palestinians should be expelled from their lands and that a tourist resort be built in the Gaza Strip. These proposals sparked international criticism and disrupted the efforts of Arab countries to build a solution that considered the interests of both sides.

Two months later, the ceasefire ended, and Israel resumed its attacks on Gaza, once again increasing the number of civilian deaths. The proposal by Arab countries to form a government involving the Palestinian Authority does not appear to be acceptable to the more right-wing sectors of the Israeli government, and the prospect of expelling Palestinians from Gaza—one way or another—has been hinted at in official statements. Israel has been escalating its containment actions against Middle Eastern actors aligned with Iran and supporters of the Hamas group in Gaza, altering the balance of power in the region (such as with Hezbollah). This also sheds light on the beginning of bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, Israel’s main regional rival with nuclear weapon capabilities.

Trump’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is therefore disappointing. Once again, and without facing resistance from other NATO countries, the United States is providing unconditional support to Israel, to the detriment of a Global South population with a high number of casualties, most of them civilians (around 46,000 people). Moreover, the U.S. government has canceled USAID humanitarian aid contracts in the Middle East and temporarily shut down the American cooperation agenda.

Trump and the trade war

Regarding U.S. trade relations, Donald Trump’s most significant action during his first term was the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which led to a new format renamed the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which he considered more favorable. The country withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), froze negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and imposed specific tariffs on certain trade partners. However, as is often the case with the far right, even though his behavior deviated from political liberalism, it did not seem to stray far from economic liberalism as a guiding principle in the economic field.

This time, Trump has taken a stance clearly opposed to liberalism, showing a bias that many far-right thinkers prefer not to display. He has implemented a protectionist policy, imposing tariffs on other countries, whether or not they are close U.S. allies. He began by threatening neighboring countries Canada and Mexico (its main trade partners), and then extended the measures to others. This was not surprising, as he had indicated it during his campaign, but the breadth of the tariffs and the lack of clear rules drew attention.

Apparently, the determination of the new tariffs was not based on an assessment that considered the various factors affecting international trade, but rather on a formula focused on measuring the trade deficit the United States had with each country. The geographic location of the countries was not taken into account either; the measure responded solely to whether a country had a trade surplus or deficit with the United States. For countries with which the U.S. had a trade deficit, tariffs ranged between 11% and 50%. For the others, tariffs were set at 10%.

Donald Trump’s rates on April 3¹

The table includes U.S. allies, as well as Latin American and Caribbean countries. China is not included, as the tariffs applied to that country began at 34% and have already surpassed 100%. One week after establishing the tariffs, the Trump administration reversed course, freezing all tariffs — except those on China — at 10% for 90 days. These fluctuations are characteristic of Trump’s behavior and generate increased concern and mistrust.

The impact of these tariffs was strongly felt in stock markets and exchange rates of other countries. The centrality of the United States in the global economy means that its actions affect everyone else. Many of the countries affected by the tariff increases are U.S. partners, which in itself causes distancing, as well as negotiation efforts or retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products — as China is doing. The result will be a global trade war, with negative consequences for economic growth and inflation. Trade threats toward China are nothing new from Trump, but now it is escalating into a direct trade war. Countries in the Global South with industrial sectors fear being flooded with Chinese industrial goods at highly competitive prices, which would negatively impact their own production, deepen dependence on China, and hinder the development of local value-added industries. In any case, Trump’s erratic tariff policies generate significant uncertainty in stock markets and in international relations more broadly.

Secondly, the planet is currently facing the severe consequences of climate change, and countries and international institutions are seeking to transition to a green economy. On the other hand, a global trade war absorbs resources, making it harder to confront environmental challenges and undermining progress toward COP 30, which will be held in November 2025 in Belém, Brazil.

Finally, there is the issue of uncertainty. Donald Trump may backtrack or negotiate with some countries, but the way his tariff policy was decided and announced is causing doubts and uncertainties that, in economic terms, are leading to recession and reduced investment. Trump’s behavior calls into question the model followed by the economy since the 2000s: one based on trade liberalism and global value chains. This uncertainty certainly has a particularly strong impact on resource-poor countries in the Global South.

Latin America and the limits on immigration

The United States’ behavior toward Latin America has understandably caused concern in the region. During his first term, Donald Trump distanced the U.S. from Latin America, although he did promote the creation of the Lima Group. At that time, the crisis in Venezuela held a prominent place on the agenda. However, the main cause for concern was the criticism of and restrictions on immigration, which is largely composed of Latin Americans.

Donald Trump does not have a regional foreign policy specifically directed at Latin America, which could be seen as an advantage. But the migration crackdown that has intensified during his second term has affected interregional relations. In addition to the well-known restrictions on immigrant entry, the U.S. government has implemented a policy of deporting Latin Americans of various nationalities via flights under precarious conditions. One group of Venezuelans, for example, was sent to prisons in El Salvador.

This has caused friction with several Latin American governments and spread fear among Latin American communities living in the United States. Some countries attempted stronger responses — such as Colombia, when President Gustavo Petro refused to allow military planes carrying deportees to land on Colombian territory. Donald Trump responded by threatening a trade war. The crisis was eventually resolved, and since then, countries in the region have sought to avoid conflict with the U.S., choosing instead to resolve disagreements through diplomacy.

Making matters worse, there is no unified position among Latin American presidents. Presidents Javier Milei of Argentina and Santiago Peña of Paraguay have adopted stances aligned with the Trump administration. At the summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the final declaration reaffirmed the autonomy of the region’s countries and expressed criticism of the tariff war. However, three member states refused to sign the declaration.

Expectations for the future

Donald Trump’s changes to U.S. foreign policy, beyond causing surprise and dominating international media coverage, are expected to have a negative impact on international politics and the liberal international order.

The surprise comes despite the indications Trump gave during his presidential campaign. The absence of a structured project to support the behavior adopted by the United States—and an approach that appears to be solely self-interested—elevates that surprise to fear. There is no doubt that Trump’s initiatives will provoke changes in international institutions, although the full extent of these changes is still unknown. It could be the most significant structural shift in the international order since the end of the bipolar era. And change always brings apprehension.

Questions arise, such as: What impact will U.S. behavior have on multilateral institutions? What role will China play in a fragmented world? How will international security be structured with less U.S. involvement? Will the tariffs imposed by the U.S. government trigger a global economic recession? Will liberalism cease to be the foundation of the international economic system?

From a Latin American perspective, the central question is: What could happen to U.S. hegemony in the region? Is it possible that it will weaken? This uncertainty generates ambivalent and even contradictory feelings. On one hand, a potential crisis of U.S. hegemony could reduce bilateral cooperation with the region on key issues such as combating organized crime, technological or environmental cooperation, and the maintenance of low trade tariffs that the U.S. has granted for many years. On the other hand, given the historically oppressive nature of that hegemony, its weakening could create space for greater autonomy for Latin American countries.

From a Global South perspective, similar sentiments apply to the impact of U.S. isolationism on the international order. Since the 1960s, several countries from the South, including Brazil, have sought—through partnerships and multilateral initiatives—to counterbalance the weight of the United States in the international system. The expectation is that the unstable and disoriented foreign policy behavior of the U.S. under Donald Trump will lead to a reduction of its strong presence in international politics and a loss of partners. In a more multipolar order, Global South countries tend to grow stronger. As Celso Amorim put it, *”we must learn to live in this multipolar world.”² It is, therefore, a time of expectations and challenges, with the goal being to navigate these challenges in the pursuit of building a better world.

[1]Source: Ben Chu and Tom Edgington. How were Trump’s rates calculated? BBC News Brazil, April 3, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/cz79wxwxyg4o

[2]Interview with Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and current international affairs advisor to the Government of Lula da Silva. By Mónica Bergamo, Celso Amorim says that Trump is interested ‘nu e cru’ and that Brazil fears it will reorganize. Folha de São Paulo, March 22, 2025.