Iran and the Middle East: Between strategic weakening, internal resilience, and regional reconfiguration

The Middle East has entered a phase of accelerated transformation. The twelve-day war of June 2025 and the new military escalation of February 2026 should be understood as stages of the same regional dynamic: the convergence between Israel’s strategy of degrading Iranian capabilities and the American interest in limiting Tehran’s regional and nuclear reach. October 7, 2023 accelerated a deliberate Israeli strategy aimed at weakening Iranian capabilities in its regional environment and reducing the operational effectiveness of the actors of the so-called “axis of resistance.” The central paradox is that Iran appears simultaneously weakened and resilient: it has lost regional strategic reach, yet it retains internal instruments of survival that make an immediate collapse unlikely.

The weakening of Iran’s regional axis

Since October 7, 2023, Israel has carried out a systematic campaign of attrition against Iran’s main allies. It began with the weakening of Hamas in Gaza, followed by the decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. These blows formed part of a coordinated strategy to isolate Iran from its most important allies and armed partners:

• Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories.
• Hezbollah in Lebanon.
• The Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.
• Various factions of the Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq.
• And Ansar Allah in Yemen, known as the Houthis.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria resulted from a combination of factors: the accumulated exhaustion of the Syrian regime itself, pressure from internal opposition forces, the weakening of its Iranian and Russian support, and the growing role of Turkey and Qatar in shaping post-Assad Syria. For Tehran, the loss of Syria was a major strategic blow: a key partner in its regional project disappeared, and a vital corridor linking Iran to the Eastern Mediterranean through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon — and enabling logistical support to Lebanese Hezbollah — was weakened.

Although the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq continue to exist and operate today, their strategic weight has been significantly reduced compared to the period when Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime functioned as operational pillars of Iranian regional influence. Therefore, Iran has today lost many of its fundamental cards in the Middle East. This situation appears to have left Tehran in a significantly more vulnerable position vis-à-vis its adversaries, particularly Israel and the United States. Both interpreted this situation as a historic opportunity to alter the regional balance in their favor.

Iranian resilience: structural and doctrinal factors

The evolution of the conflict has revealed the limits of a linear interpretation of Iranian weakening. Despite the pressure exerted on the country, Tehran has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for resistance and resilience, sufficient to prevent military and economic pressure from resulting in regime overthrow or capitulation. Contingent factors alone are insufficient to explain this resilience: they combine with a set of structural and doctrinal elements that reveal the depth of Iran’s commitment to its survival as an Islamic republic.

More than a perfect capacity for anticipation, the Iranian case demonstrates a notable capacity for absorption. Tehran has made mistakes, suffered intelligence penetrations, and lost important figures, yet the system has survived. Not only are its military capabilities uncertain, but also its thresholds for retaliation, its tolerance for costs, and its willingness to activate direct or indirect responses through various regional theaters. At the institutional level, Tehran has shown a remarkable ability to replace senior officials who have been killed or removed without losing ideological or operational continuity. This demonstrates that Iranian resilience depends not solely on leadership, but on an institutional and security structure prepared to absorb losses.

From the perspective of the political elite, the current conflict is not merely another geopolitical dispute, but an existential struggle for the regime and its ideology. Changing this situation would require conditions that go beyond traditional military measures. Many Iranians, including sectors openly critical of the regime, believe that provoking meaningful political change requires avoiding any association between internal reform or transformation movements and collaboration with external adversaries such as Israel or the United States. This dynamic creates a complex dilemma, because external pressure aimed at weakening the regime also complicates reform from within. This partly explains why the Iranian regime could remain in power.

Regional reconfiguration: Israel and its limits

The current conflict also serves to examine deep and long-term regional trends. First, Israeli objectives extend beyond immediate security concerns: at least among influential sectors of the Israeli right and the religious nationalist movement, there has been a revival of maximalist territorial imaginaries associated with the concept of “Greater Israel.” This project envisions a Jewish state whose effective territory would extend significantly beyond internationally recognized borders. In practical terms, these currents advocate or normalize varying degrees of Israeli control over Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and “security zones” (the so-called buffer zones) in Syrian or Lebanese territories, especially in southern Lebanon (the area between northern Israel and the Litani River), whose control would be subject to Israeli conditions without necessarily being annexed de jure.

The outcome of the confrontation with Iran will also determine the future of Israel and, by extension, the United States as regional guarantor. For Israel, the most likely existential threat stems not so much from traditional external actors as from internal dynamics: growing social polarization, processes of radicalization within different sectors of the population, and the challenge of maintaining long-term national cohesion amid competing identities and historical narratives within the conflict.

With all due caution, a parallel may be drawn with the 1956 Suez Crisis: at that time, France and Great Britain — two colonial powers — saw their international imperial role deteriorate after a failed attempt to reaffirm their power through force. The United States, in its current role as Israel’s unquestioned supporter, may also be facing an analogous moment. Its almost unconditional support for Israel may strengthen Washington’s military influence in the region, but at the same time it erodes its political legitimacy among broad sectors of the Middle East and the Muslim-majority world.

Communal identities and new alliances

These dynamics recall how, in 2004, the administration of George W. Bush (2001–2008) promoted the so-called “Greater Middle East Project.” Officially, the project was presented as an agenda of political, economic, and educational reform. However, throughout much of the region it was viewed with suspicion because it was associated with a logic of external political engineering capable of weakening nation-states and encouraging forms of communal, sectarian, or ethnic reorganization. Today, a logic that many associate with that project has reemerged: the erosion of nation-states and the reorganization of politics around communal, sectarian, or ethnic identities.

• In Syria, there is a trend toward territorial and political reorganization based on distinct communal loyalties (primarily Druze, Alawites, and Kurds).
• In Iraq, although the country formally maintains its territorial integrity, there remains a growing institutional particularism in which the Kurds stand out clearly from the Arab world, while at the same time many Sunnis and Shiites continue to insist on their sectarian and cultural particularities within the state framework.
• In Lebanon, a similar phenomenon is visible, where society — already composed of 18 different communities — shows increasing fragmentation between pro-Hezbollah currents (predominantly Shiite) and anti-Hezbollah groups represented by the Druze, as well as most Sunnis and Christians.

Therefore, in several parts of the Middle East there is a visible erosion of the traditional national consensus and a shift toward more primary group identities (a phenomenon that can be understood through the concept of asabiya, an Arabic term referring to group spirit or communal solidarity, especially visible when communities cease to identify fully with state structures). At the same time, this fragmentation also reflects the internal crisis of postcolonial states, authoritarianism, corruption, the militarization of identities, and the failure of many national pacts to integrate communities equitably.

The war surrounding Iran is also reshaping broader global strategic and economic dynamics. Strategically, the conflict is redefining energy routes, logistical corridors, and security alliances in an environment where predictability is rapidly declining. Economically, sanctions, the costs of conflict, and disruptions to regional trade are producing chain effects in global hydrocarbon markets, commodities, and investment flows.

These strategic changes are also reflected in the Gulf. The withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from OPEC, effective from May 1, 2026, and reports concerning the deployment of an Israeli Iron Dome battery during the war with Iran should not be interpreted as signs of a break with Washington. Rather, they reveal a hedging strategy: Gulf states, particularly Abu Dhabi, still regard the United States as their principal security guarantor, but they seek to reduce the risks of exclusive dependence. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure — energy, ports, airports, air defense, electricity, and desalination — has strengthened the desire to diversify partners, suppliers, and technologies. In this sense, cooperation with Israel, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, or South Korea does not replace the American umbrella, but rather complements it and compels Washington to continue demonstrating its strategic utility.

The conflict surrounding Iran should not be read as an isolated episode, but as the latest and most violent expression of deeper regional transformations that have been developing for years. These transformations involve the weakening of traditional state structures, as well as the rise of communal identities as primary axes of loyalty and conflict. At the same time, the limits of external power in reshaping regions according to foreign designs are being tested, while the tension persists between the pursuit of security through domination and the need for mutual recognition as a basis for stable peace.

As for Iran, the immediate challenge lies in navigating the current phase of extreme pressure while preserving its territorial integrity and identity as an Islamic republic. This entails a series of open scenarios, considering that the Iranian regime does not appear to be facing immediate collapse. Nevertheless, it is going through a phase of profound exhaustion due to economic crisis, erosion of legitimacy, intense international pressure, social unrest, and uncertainty regarding political succession.

Iran and the future: four internal scenarios

Iran’s nuclear program is a cross-cutting variable in every scenario. For Tehran, it can function as an instrument of deterrence, a negotiating card, and a symbol of sovereignty. For Israel and the United States, it represents a limit they are unwilling to allow Iran to cross. Therefore, the nuclear issue could accelerate either a limited negotiation or a new military escalation.

Taking the nuclear variable as a starting point, and considering the interaction between external pressure, internal cohesion of the coercive apparatus, and social unrest, four internal scenarios may be imagined. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Authoritarian continuity may combine with securitized succession; pragmatism may function as a survival tactic within a more repressive system; and rupture scenarios would only become plausible if simultaneous fractures emerged between society, the economy, elites, and the coercive apparatus.

1. Authoritarian continuity and securitized succession

The most likely scenario would be a combination of authoritarian continuity and securitized succession. Under this hypothesis, the regime would preserve its core institutions (the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, the judiciary, intelligence services, and the Revolutionary Guard), while civilian executive power would remain subordinate to the real centers of decision-making. The succession issue would not alter this logic; on the contrary, it could reinforce it if the replacement of the Supreme Leader occurs under the tutelage of the Revolutionary Guard and the security organs. The decisive point would not only be the identity of the new Supreme Leader, but the balance of power emerging among the clergy, the Revolutionary Guard, the intelligence services, and civilian institutions. The regime’s survival would rely on social control characterized by repression, censorship, and digital surveillance. This scenario is plausible because the system has demonstrated the capacity to suppress internal protests. However, it leaves unresolved Iran’s structural problems: corruption, inflation, sanctions, water crisis, inequality, and the disconnect between the ruling establishment and a society undergoing generational renewal.

2. Pragmatic adaptation of authoritarianism

A second scenario would involve a pragmatic adaptation of authoritarianism. In this context, the regime would neither democratize nor renounce its principal instruments of control, but would attempt to reduce tensions through limited concessions: renewed nuclear negotiations, partial sanctions relief, some degree of social flexibility, or selective economic reforms. However, this scenario faces a limitation: it would encounter strong internal resistance, especially from sectors benefiting from the sanctions economy and political control. Therefore, its viability would depend on whether the elites perceive that continued absolute rigidity threatens the regime’s survival.

3. Revolutionary crisis

A third scenario, possible but conditional, would be a revolutionary crisis. For regime change to occur, mass protests alone would not suffice. It would require a combination of sustained popular mobilization — including strikes — divisions among the elites, loss of cohesion or effectiveness within the repressive apparatus, and fractures inside the coercive institutions. Yet as long as the Revolutionary Guard, the Basij militias (internal security force), and the security services remain cohesive, the Iranian regime will retain a high capacity for survival. Moreover, given the fragmentation of the opposition to the Iranian regime, it is difficult for the opposition to become a counterpower capable of weakening the state apparatus or provoking decisive fissures at its core. Thus, in this scenario, the tipping point would not be popular protest alone, but the possible convergence between urban mobilization, strikes in strategic sectors, state fiscal crisis, and loss of confidence within segments of the administrative or coercive apparatus.

4. State fragmentation

A fourth scenario, low in probability but high in impact, would be state fragmentation. Although Iran possesses a more robust state tradition than several regional states affected by recent civil wars, a scenario of severe weakening of the center cannot be ruled out if a succession crisis, economic collapse, external military pressure, intense protests, and factional struggles were to coincide. The decisive factor would be the inability of central power to maintain simultaneously territorial cohesion, coercive command, and minimal resource distribution. This situation would open a prolonged phase of instability without necessarily guaranteeing a democratic transition. Its effects would be particularly significant for Iraq, Turkey, the Gulf, the Caucasus, and energy markets.

Conclusions

The most likely short-term scenario is a combination of authoritarian continuity and securitized succession. In other words, the Iranian regime would seek to survive through hardening the system rather than through substantive reform, while not excluding tactical concessions aimed at reducing internal or external pressure. It is highly likely to preserve its formal institutions, but with a growing weight of the Revolutionary Guard and the security organs. This means that the Islamic republic could become less clerical in practice, yet far more militarized in its day-to-day functioning. At the same time, it would preserve the foundations of its foreign policy, based on a combination of revolutionary legitimacy, anti-imperialism, military deterrence, and the gradual reconstruction of its regional capabilities.

The Iranian regime is experiencing a phase of historical exhaustion, but not immediate collapse. The principal strength of the ruling system remains the cohesion of the coercive apparatus, which has survived severe blows and attacks. Its greatest weakness lies in the erosion of its social legitimacy, especially among youth, urban women, professional sectors, and groups affected by the economic crisis. Nevertheless, its ability to withstand American and Israeli pressure may also reinforce, among certain sectors of Iranian society and regional public opinion, the image of a regime capable of surviving direct confrontation. This means that, in the short and medium term, the Iranian regime may change the official figures of power, but not the core of power itself.

The mediation efforts attributed to Pakistan appear to proceed from this logic: due to its geographical proximity to Iran, its ties with China, its channels with Washington, and its sensitivity to any regional destabilization, Islamabad may see containing violence as more viable than betting on regime change.

Finally, three trajectories may be envisioned in the relationship between Iran, Israel, and the United States:

• The first would be a limited negotiation focused on containing escalation, restoring diplomatic channels, and establishing partial restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for gradual sanctions relief.
• The second would be a war of attrition marked by selective Israeli or American strikes, calibrated Iranian responses, and intermittent activation of allies in Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon.
• The third, more dangerous trajectory would involve a much broader regional escalation affecting the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, energy infrastructure, and the security of neighboring countries.

These trajectories are not mutually exclusive: a limited negotiation may develop in parallel with a war of attrition, and this combination could in fact define the most likely phase of the conflict. In none of these scenarios does an immediate change of the Iranian regime appear likely. Therefore, the central question is not whether Iran has been weakened, but whether its adversaries can transform that weakening into a more stable regional order. The nuclear issue will remain the intersection point between internal scenarios and external trajectories: it may serve the regime as an instrument of cohesion and deterrence, but also as a trigger for new escalations.