New initiatives by the US and the EU in Africa to counter Chinese presence
Matías Mongan, Journalist and contributor to the Gate Centre, Madrid
In recent years, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) have increased their cooperation with African countries, taking advantage of a shift in China’s cooperation strategy (Yeung 2024). In June 2022, the Group of Seven (G7) announced the launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which aims to mobilize $600 billion to fund infrastructure projects in middle- and low-income economies. It was presented as a more “sustainable” financing alternative (Chellaney, 2017; Roland, 2021) to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As part of this, the EU committed to allocate €300 billion through its Global Gateway program, half of which is earmarked for projects in Africa that strengthen institutional capacities in areas such as infrastructure, technological development, climate change, and others (EU 2025).
One of the most important initiatives is the construction of the Lobito Corridor, a railway of approximately 1,300 kilometers (Chabala 2024), which aims to connect the Port of Lobito in Angola with mineral-rich regions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. These minerals, such as cobalt and copper, are used in the tech, automotive, and defense industries of the US and Europe. However, the project faces numerous challenges that cast doubt on its feasibility. On the one hand, it is unclear whether President Donald Trump will continue the initiative launched by his predecessor, Joe Biden. On the other hand, PGII seems to be replicating a model of cooperation similar to China’s during the first decade of the BRI, which, by focusing on large infrastructure projects, contributed to an increase in African countries’ external debt levels (Mutai 2025).
The EU and US diplomatic bet in Africa
China’s diplomatic presence in Africa is broad and operates through various international organizations to which Xi Jinping’s government has allocated significant financial resources to support African development programs. One of the main strengths of Chinese cooperation in Africa is its ability to prioritize “agency”—that is, the diplomatic needs of its counterparts. This has allowed China to secure the backing of African countries in various multilateral forums (FOCAC 2024).
A major initiative was the establishment of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. At its latest summit, held in Beijing in September 2024, the Chinese government pledged to invest around 360 billion yuan ($50.6 billion) between 2025 and 2027 in African cooperation projects in areas such as industrial promotion, digital connectivity, health, security, and sustainable development, among others (FOCAC 2024). Another key platform is the BRI, which includes nearly all African states. “In 2023, African countries received $21.7 billion in cooperation agreements under the initiative, including investments in ports, railways, and renewable energy” (de Kluiver 2024).
According to official discourse, unlike Western cooperation, Chinese aid lacks direct political conditionality (Himmer and Rod 2022) and seeks to adapt to the development models promoted by African countries under the so-called “Agenda 2063” (AU 2025). This enabled African governments to carry out infrastructure projects aimed at modernizing their economies. However, China has also been accused of promoting a “debt trap diplomacy” (Chellaney 2017) to expand its influence in the region. Still, it’s important to note that most African debt is held by traditional creditors such as the International Monetary Fund (Okoth 2025).
Due to growing difficulties faced by Chinese banks in recovering their investments and a slowdown in the Chinese economy, in 2022 the Xi Jinping government decided to change the BRI’s operational model—from funding large infrastructure projects in low-income countries to promoting smaller-scale initiatives in middle-income economies, mainly in the tech and energy sectors (Yeung 2024). This new Chinese infrastructure model became known as “Xiao Er Mei”, which roughly translates as “small and beautiful” (Li 2023).
This shift in China’s BRI approach was seized upon by the EU and the US, who in recent years have sought to deepen cooperation with African governments to counter China’s influence on the continent and strengthen economic ties: “Global Gateway can be seen as part of a diplomatic effort to rebuild EU-Africa relations on the basis of a more modern partnership centered on trade and investment, rather than development aid” (Teevan 2024).
Currently, the EU as a bloc is Africa’s main investor, trade partner, and provider of official development assistance (Runde 2024). However, its diplomatic ties have deteriorated due to a series of events, most notably the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine (Ballesteros and Mongan 2025). The Global Gateway seeks to change this scenario, but improved political dialogue with African leaders will be essential to ensure that cooperation projects align better with regional development programs (Teevan 2024). Unlike China, European countries have struggled to establish smooth political dialogue with African leaders—even during this new phase where the aim is for Europe and Africa to be perceived as “partners” jointly promoting sustainable development.
The Global Gateway focuses on large infrastructure projects, such as the Medusa Submarine Cable Project, which aims to enhance digital connectivity between Europe and North African countries, fostering a more competitive African digital economy capable of integrating into global value chains. Another example is the Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines, and Health Technologies in Africa (MAV+) program, which seeks to turn South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Ghana into pharmaceutical innovation hubs. This would allow Africa to produce 60% of its vaccines by 2040 (European Commission 2025).
The most important project is the construction of the Lobito Corridor, which would facilitate the transport of minerals extracted in southern Congo and northwestern Zambia (mainly cobalt and iron) to the Port of Lobito in Angola, from where they can be exported to European countries. To this end, the century-old Benguela Railway, stretching 1,344 kilometers, will also be modernized to connect Lobito with the Angolan town of Luau on the border with the DRC. Additionally, around 350 kilometers of new railway lines will be constructed (Arnold 2024) to link Luacano (Angola) with Chingola (Zambia), and Luau (Angola) with Kolwezi (DRC) (European Commission 2023). This latter region holds significant cobalt reserves—a key material for lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles. In fact, the Democratic Republic of the Congo produced 74% of the world’s cobalt in 2024 (Pistilli 2024).
The construction of the Lobito Corridor aims to facilitate the transport of African cobalt and copper to the Atlantic Ocean and position itself as an alternative to the Tazara Corridor—a 1,860-kilometer railway built by China between 1970 and 1975 that connects the port of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) with Kapiri Mposhi (Zambia). In March 2025, it was announced that the Chinese company Civil Engineering Construction Corporation would invest $1.4 billion to revitalize this line, which connects to the Indian Ocean and is used by China to transport cobalt and copper extracted in Zambia and the DRC, where it controls most of the production.

Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights
The U.S. and the EU Respond to China’s Leadership in Africa
Although the United States and the European Union are attempting to challenge China’s leadership in Africa, there are doubts about the viability of their diplomatic strategy. Donald Trump’s second term raises uncertainties regarding the continuation of the Lobito Corridor construction project. In the 2025 budget, prepared by the Biden administration, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) was allocated $50 billion (GPO 2024). We must wait until September 30, 2025, when the fiscal year ends, to see whether the Trump administration allocates any funds for the construction of the corridor. So far, PGII does not appear in the 2026 budget or in its technical annex (GovInfo 2025).
In line with his “America First” policy, the Republican president does not seem willing to bear the economic costs that would come with competing for spheres of influence with China in Africa. In fact, quite the opposite is happening: he has reduced U.S. involvement on the continent by dismantling cooperation instruments such as USAID (Cilliers 2025). The White House is framing diplomatic relations with African countries through a commercial lens, relegating development cooperation to the background (Peltier 2025). In this context, the Trump administration has imposed a 15% tariff on African countries, including those involved in the Lobito Corridor project—Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia (BBC 2025). If the United States ultimately withdraws from the project, the future of the Lobito Corridor will depend on financial contributions from the EU and its Global Gateway program.
The EU, for its part, has been working intensively to bring positions closer and reach agreements ahead of the upcoming EU–African Union (AU) summit, which will take place on November 24–25, 2025, in Luanda, Angola. On May 21, the third meeting of foreign ministers from both regions was held in Brussels as a pre-summit event. Among other topics, it highlighted progress in implementing the Africa–Europe program under the Global Gateway initiative (European Commission 2025).
In this way, the EU seeks to position itself as a counterbalance to China’s leadership on the African continent. African leaders, in turn, support the revival of ties with Europe not only to diversify their economies but also in the hope that Europe can replace China and finance key infrastructure projects. In this regard, the main focus would be the construction of the Lobito Corridor, but it is essential that this initiative does not contribute to an increase in African countries’ debt levels.
If the EU truly wants to become a player capable of fostering development in Africa (and in doing so, counter China’s presence in the region), the cooperation driven under the Global Gateway framework must be shielded from the political fluctuations of the European integration process. It also requires a multidimensional approach—not one solely focused on the extraction of strategic natural resources or migration issues. This bias only strengthens politically charged narratives spread by the governments of China and, primarily, Russia (Alvarado 2025), which emphasize that Europe’s interest in Africa is merely to pursue its own geopolitical goals. For this reason, a new form of European extractivism in Africa would only contribute to the resurgence of nationalist and anti-colonial discourses, which could jeopardize the relaunch of the EU-Africa relationship and reduce the EU’s room for action on the continent.