The 4th EU–CELAC Summit: More Consensus than Dissent

Francisco Sánchez, Director of the Institute of Ibero-America and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Salamanca

That one of the most-viewed news items about the 4th EU–CELAC Summit was that President Pedro Sánchez wore a guayabera confirms the perception of the Summit as a second-tier event in which the most noteworthy aspect is the attire of Spain’s Prime Minister. Despite the absences—only 9 out of 60 heads of state or government attended—the Summit nonetheless produced a number of politically, economically, and socially relevant outcomes for the future of bi-regional relations. If we look beyond the number of participating leaders—another common headline—and read between the lines of the Final Joint Declaration or the documents resulting from the multiple parallel meetings that make up the Summit, we will see that there are more reasons to consider the glass half full; but here, I want to focus on some facts that deserve attention when making a political assessment of the event with a view toward improving bi-regional relations.

Some initial considerations

Summits of heads of state are regional or interregional dialogue mechanisms that are not limited solely to the leaders’ meeting. While it is true that this is the peak moment, there is a great deal of preparatory work involving agreements and prior meetings, as well as parallel events—such as business forums or civil-society gatherings—that also form part of the summits and yield good results. Although these forums may not fully achieve their expected objectives, such as the signing of major contracts or the participation of large business groups, they serve as a thermometer of reality and as mechanisms to introduce new issues into the public agenda.

Without falling into the simplistic evaluation of the Summit based on who attended, I believe it is worth analyzing the last-minute cancellations by the President of the Commission and the German Chancellor. Beyond the fact that the gesture may be seen as a lack of interest in Latin America, the real concern is whether the true reason for their absence is the one highlighted by Germany’s public news broadcaster in its headline: “Europe neglects Latin America so as not to anger Trump.” The underlying idea is that European leaders did not want to travel to a region that is militarily threatened by the United States. Under these circumstances, greater participation from Latin American and Caribbean leaders was expected as a show of support for the countries under threat, but only President Lula of Brazil attended. These absences speak volumes about the much-vaunted Latin American solidarity. To be fair, it should be noted that the Declaration did include a specific point criticizing the military threat, although the support was not unanimous.

The Declaration

It is a 52-point document that may at times seem like a list of good wishes and requests, but it is essential reading for anyone wanting to comment on the subject. Some issues are included due to a particular country’s interests and almost always appear in declarations like this one, such as the Malvinas dispute or the condemnation of the embargo on Cuba. Others, driven clearly by the EU, can be added—such as those related to its proposal on transitions under the Global Gateway framework. But what is not included is also significant. In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is no explicit mention of the free trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur, an absence that stands out even more given that this agreement has been a flagship of the European proposal for 20 years and is supposedly in the final stage of ratification in the European Parliament.

This omission becomes even more relevant given that point 27 of the Declaration explicitly mentions the agreements with Chile, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Within this context, France’s stance gains importance. France, one of the main detractors of the agreement, has shown considerable ambivalence. After saying at COP30—hosted by President Lula, a supporter of the agreement—that it was “optimistic,” and as a defense against the criticism that comment generated, President Macron later said in Mexico—a country he chose to visit instead of attending the Santa Marta Summit—that he would remain “vigilant” regarding the terms of the Mercosur agreement. Given this scenario, it is possible that the omission of the Mercosur agreement was meant to avoid exposing the divisions and doubts the agreement continues to generate.

Another way to read the declarations is by paying attention to the positions countries take regarding certain issues—ones on which some want to take a particular stance and others do not. In such cases, countries make what, in summit jargon, are called “dissociations”—that is, they record their disagreement with specific points. While no European country dissociated itself, several CELAC countries marked divergent positions. Thus, on one hand, they showed clear alignment with the U.S. and its international agenda, and on the other, they rejected what they disparagingly call the “globalist agenda”: gender, the 2030 Agenda, the Pact for the Future, or the Sustainable Development Goals. Leading this group is Milei’s Argentina, which disagreed with the wording or content of eight paragraphs. Paraguay also had objections in both directions, though fewer and less intense. In the group of countries that dissent so as not to upset the U.S. are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. The points that bothered them most were point 18, on the embargo on Cuba, and point 10, which refers to Latin America and the Caribbean as a “zone of peace” while expressing, in very mild terms, concern about U.S. military actions in the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Ecuador—also among the staunch U.S. allies—opposed point 15 of the Declaration, which makes a mild reference to crimes committed against the population of Gaza.

To conclude

Although the outcomes of the Summit fall short of the expectations generated when Colombia was announced as the host and European authorities declared their commitment to Latin America as a preferred partner, I believe there were significant advances for the bilateral relationship that have not received sufficient attention—such as the “Care Pact” and the “Citizen Security Alliance.” This latter agreement is particularly important for tackling the global problem of drug trafficking.

Awaiting the roadmap for the next Summit—scheduled to take place in Brussels in 2027—the EU should consider assessing how well the current summit model is functioning and whether it might be worth adopting the successful Chinese model of meetings with CELAC, which are not necessarily held among heads of government, though they may participate. In this way, attendance becomes a merit rather than an absence that carries a penalty.