The G-20 in Rio de Janeiro: a successful Global South Summit
Author: Susanne Gratius, Academic Coordinator of the Gate Center and Full Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM)
In these turbulent times, the recent United Nations, Climate and G-20 Future Summits in Brazil shed some light on a dark international scenario: they resumed the great liberal commitments and reactivated the almost forgotten global or multilateral governance. In the case of the G-20 Summit, the impetus did not come from the North, but from the non-Western countries that constitute a clear majority in the Group of Twenty (see table 1).
Table 1: G-20 Members (21)
| North (9) | Global South (12) | Guests (4) |
| Europe: Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, EU Others: Australia, Canada, United States, Japan | AL: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico Asia: China*, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Russia, Türkiye* Africa: Saudi Arabia, South Africa, African Union | ASEAN, World Bank, Spain, United Nations |
* self-definition: In his speech at the G-20 Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted that “China has always been a member of the Global South.”
At the Summit on November 18 and 19, 2024, Brazil served not only as host but also as agenda setter. The meeting of leaders in Rio de Janeiro – a symbolic place as the venue for the second Earth Summit in 1992 – reflected the prominence of emerging countries and new powers such as Brazil, China, Indonesia and India. More visible than in previous G-20 Summits, Rio de Janeiro was marked by the interests of the Global South.
Instead of prioritizing the classic financial issues that dominate the agenda of the exclusive club of the World Economic Forum in Davos, the final declaration of the G-20 Summit reads like a list of good intentions from the United Nations, with a clear focus on inequality, sustainable development and global governance institutions – including the redistribution of quotas in the International Monetary Fund -, in accordance with the three priorities of Brazil’s pro tempore presidency.
The somewhat idealistic motto “create a just world and a sustainable planet” coincided with the national and international objectives of Lula da Silva’s third government, which managed – against all odds – to create a consensus among all the members that make up the G-20, including a commitment to a two-state solution to the Gaza conflict and even a mention of the war in Ukraine through initiatives leading to “lasting peace.”
Another relevant point was equality between men and women, also signed by countries unlikely to comply with it, such as Saudi Arabia. An important initiative proposed by Lula and supported by the G-20 was the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, to which a total of 82 countries joined and which gives continuity to the three mandates of the Brazilian President, very committed to the Agenda. 2030 and sustainable development.
The idea of imposing a global tax of 2% on the wealth of large fortunes and investing more in development projects was supported by several leaders, among others by the invited Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez. However, the initiative, which is based on the recommendations of economist Thomas Piketty and was defended by Lula da Silva, did not enter the final declaration of the G-20 and was rejected again, as in other previous Summits.
Towards 2026: End of the emerging market cycle
Given the inertia of the United Nations and its stalled reform of the Security Council, informal forums such as the G-20 have replaced part of its agenda. The 85 points of the final declaration of Rio signal the transition of the group of economic-financial issues towards a much broader agenda prone to development problems, which already includes practically all international issues.
Although this comprehensive approach is laudable, it also dilutes the functions of the group, initially more committed to economic and financial stability than to sustainable development, inequality or reforms of global institutions that were issues that corresponded to the United Nations. Although it is easier to adopt commitments between 20 or 21 members, we must not forget the 172 countries that are not represented in the G-20, including Spain, which participates as a guest country.
Thanks to the organizational and negotiating capacity of the Government of Brazil, the Rio de Janeiro Summit has been a success and ended with a final declaration that, despite his reluctance, was signed even by the ultra-liberal Argentine President, Javier Milei. In a tense international scenario or in a world adrift, increasingly distant from the old global liberal commitments and multilateralism, generating consensus between extremely diverse countries in terms of their political regimes, beliefs, material bases and values, is of course yes a great achievement attributable to the charismatic leadership of Lula da Silva.
Brazil inherited the G-20 presidency from India and handed it over to South Africa, which will continue with the Global South agenda until 2026, when the cycle of emerging countries changes and it is up to the United States, already under the Trump Administration, to organize the Summit. of the G-20, surely with very different priorities from those of the Global South and with a much lower capacity to generate consensus around liberal commitments that Donald Trump has rejected on many occasions.
Given the change in the cycle of the G-20 presidencies, there is only one year left to deepen and expand the commitments created first in Indonesia, then in India, Brazil and then in South Africa, from a perspective of the Global South whose central objective should be to create a fairer global international architecture that reflects today’s world. There is little time left to achieve greater representation of the countries of the South in all international forums as the only recipe to re-legitimize a multilateralism that is out of use or in existential crisis.