Juan Andrés Gascón Maldonado, FPU predoctoral researcher at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and visiting researcher at FLACSO Argentina.

In just over two decades, relations between China and Latin America have undergone a significant transformation, marked by growing commercial exchange, strategic investments, and an expanding diplomatic and cultural presence. This link has generated various interpretations within the academic and political sphere, which oscillate between the vision of China as a fundamental positive actor for the region, a vision that gives it a more negative role by assimilating it to past experience of interference, or a more moderate reading that sees China as an agent of change that must be constantly reviewed.

In this context, I propose three conceptual approaches that bring together a large group of opinions in the study of the Sino-Ibero-American relationship from Latin America: Sino-optimism, Sino-pessimism and Sino-skepticism. These categories allow us to understand how different actors in the region—governments, academics, and productive sectors—interpret Chinese insertion in Ibero-America, influencing the formulation of foreign policies and cooperation strategies.

From a qualitative approach of analyzing political discourses, strategic documents and academic studies, it is possible to unravel the predominant narratives about China in Latin America. Through this transversal reading, a critical vision is provided on the diversity of positions regarding the Chinese presence and its geopolitical and economic implications for the region.

Sino-optimism: China as an engine of development and a new global order

Sino-optimism holds that the growing relationship between China and Latin America represents an opportunity for economic development, diversification of foreign relations and the region’s insertion into a more multipolar world. From this perspective, China has not only boosted trade and investment, but has also allowed Latin American countries to reduce their historical dependence on Western markets, particularly the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), as shown by the progressive weight of trade with China by traditional US partners such as Colombia, Chile and even Mexico.

An emblematic example of Sino-optimism is Chinese investment in infrastructure in the region, especially in transportation and energy. Macroprojects such as the Central Bioceanic Train, which seeks to connect Brazil, Bolivia and Peru with ports in the Atlantic and Pacific reflect the scale of the potential of this relationship, with the inauguration of the Port of Chancay as one of its most recent representations. We also find the modernization of means of transportation in countries such as Mexico, Argentina or Panama, for example, through the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), which already has impressive headquarters in several capitals of the region.

In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative (New Silk Road or Belt & Road Initiative [BRI]) has been seen by some governments as a mechanism to attract funding and improve regional connectivity, managing to attract more than 20 countries to the initiative, such as Chile, Uruguay or Peru. This initiative, both in its initial format when different initiatives landed in the region, around 2017, evolved to more and more sectors, such as education or digital governance, allowing to extend different channels of scientific cooperation, from strengthening research centers, as in Neuquén (Argentina), to collaboration in public centers announced in recent years in El Salvador. At the commercial level, it has allowed the promotion of a growing commercial exchange that has been growing year after year since 2023.

From this perspective, the relationship with China not only provides financial resources, but also fosters the construction of more horizontal South-South cooperation networks. In the political and multilateral sphere, China and the countries of the region share a common interest in reforming the international order to better include developing countries, as evidenced by the growing participation of Latin America through the inclusion of countries such as Bolivia and Cuba as partners in the BRICS and in forums such as CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) – China. This optimism also extends to the scientific and technological field, with cooperation programs in higher education, knowledge transfer and development of new technologies, such as the adoption of 5G in Brazil and Chile with the participation of Huawei.

Sino-pessimism: Dependence, reprimarization and debt trap

On the other hand, Sino-pessimism suggests that, despite the growth in economic relations, China’s influence in Latin America may reproduce new forms of structural dependence. From this point of view, China has become the main destination for the region’s raw material exports, but without generating a significant impact on productive diversification or local industrialization.

Although Chinese investment has been substantial, it has been directed mainly to extractive sectors, such as mining in Peru and Chile or agribusiness in Brazil and Argentina. This has led some analysts to argue that the region is falling into a new form of dependency, where China, although with a discourse of cooperation and development, ends up benefiting much more than the Ibero-American countries, centralizing the added value of the use of these resources outside the region where they are extracted. A concrete case in point is the impact of Chinese demand for soybeans in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, which has encouraged the expansion of the agricultural frontier and generated socio-environmental conflicts, without necessarily translating into sustainable industrial growth.

Another critical point of Sino-pessimism is indebtedness to China. Although the region has a long history of the “debt trap”, traditionally represented by organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or actors such as the US, several countries in the region have become new recipients of large sums of money in loans and financing from China, in exchange for strategic resources such as oil. This is the case of Venezuela, which has already accumulated more than $50 billion in financial commitments with China, followed by Brazil (more than $28 billion) and Ecuador (more than $18 billion). This can be interpreted as a dynamic in which China guarantees control of strategic resources, while the recipient countries are tied to financial commitments that are difficult to restructure.

In addition, infrastructure financed by China is often built by Chinese companies and workers, which limits the generation of local employment and the impact on national economies; Although this trend has been changing in several countries, much of the employment generated continues to be centralized in the extractive sectors and the volume of activity has generated discontent in local industry or, with respect to environmental criteria, also affecting rural and indigenous communities, as in the case of the lithium triangle where there have been demonstrations led by local activists and members of indigenous communities, denouncing the impacts of the deposits in their localities (mainly in southern Bolivia and the province of Jujuy in Argentina).

In political terms, some also warn about China’s influence in the region and its possible impact on government autonomy. Unlike the traditional institutional relationship with the United States or European countries, where their investments are usually conditioned on respect for human rights and democratic norms in line with the liberal narrative, China has developed relations with governments of different ideological signs and political regimes, without falling into explicit political interference. Ironically, this less “interventionism” represented by China’s indifference to the type of political regime of its partners can be seen as a negative factor, since autocratic regimes or those with less transparency and accountability may find in China an economic partner that does not inquire into their internal political behaviors. On the other hand, however, some fear that the asymmetry of power between China and the region will increasingly shape domestic agendas, as has been argued with regard to the decline in support for Taiwan vis-à-vis mainland China.

Sino-skepticism: Between asymmetric interdependence and window of opportunity

Sino-skepticism emerges as an intermediate position, recognizing that the relationship with China offers benefits as well as limitations and concerns. From this approach, authors, institutions and politicians converge in recognizing that China is and will probably continue to be a key player for the region’s economy and cooperation, but warn that this entails challenges that must be addressed. Although it is not assumed that this is an explicit dependence, Sino-skepticism warns that the relationship with China responds to an asymmetric interdependence, where the real benefits for Latin American countries remain limited.

Unlike Sino-pessimism, Sino-skepticism does not minimize the potential of the relationship with China, but stresses the importance of a more strategic negotiation by Ibero-American countries to maximize their interests. For example, while China has invested in infrastructure in the region, many of these projects respond primarily to Chinese commercial interests, such as improving access to ports to facilitate the export of raw materials. As mentioned earlier, new or renovated ports and highways in Peru or Argentina are designed to facilitate the outflow of natural resources to the Asian market, rather than to promote local development.

Sino-skepticism also values ​​advances in scientific, cultural and political cooperation, highlighting academic exchanges, the training of elites and the consolidation of multi-level networks between China and Latin America. However, it also points out that progress has not yet generated a transformative impact in the region, since cooperation continues to be dominated by the economic interests of a few agents.

From this perspective, the challenge for the countries of the region is not simply to reject or accept Chinese influence, but to develop a more active and pragmatic strategy that allows them to take advantage of the benefits of the relationship, without falling into economic or political dependence. In this sense, greater regional coordination is advocated to establish more equitable conditions in negotiations with China, strengthening strategic sectors such as technological innovation, industrial diversification and environmental sustainability, a challenge that in turn responds to the limitations and challenges in terms of regional integration and cooperation.

Conclusions

The analysis of the relationship between China and Latin America through the perspectives of Sino-optimism, Sino-pessimism and Sino-skepticism indicates the multiple interpretations it generates. While Sino-optimism highlights the benefits of South-South cooperation and the construction of a more inclusive global order, Sino-pessimism warns about the dynamics of dependency and the risks associated with the relationship with China. Sino-skepticism, on the other hand, offers a more nuanced view, recognizing both the opportunities and challenges of this relationship.

Ultimately, interaction with China is not a black and white issue, but a dynamic process in which countries must define their own strategies to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks. The key to the future of this relationship lies in greater regional articulation and a more solid negotiation agenda that will allow the region to better position itself in its relationship with the second largest global economy.