Trump’s America: the ‘expendable nation’

Alana Moceri, professor of International Relations at IE University

30 April 2025 marked the first hundred days of President Trump’s second administration. Even those who took his words seriously during the campaign have been stunned by the frenetic pace of executive orders that – from the imposition and elimination of tariffs, to threats to Ukraine’s sovereignty, to the idea of turning Gaza into a resort – have destabilised the US and the world, especially in trade and security.

Political science or international relations scholars reflect on the foreign policy doctrine of each US president, i.e. they analyse his vision of how to exercise power. While Trump’s presidency may appear to be mere chaos, it is worth remembering that during the election campaign he did not hide his personality, his hunger for power or how he intended to conduct his second administration. However, in his lust for power that allows him to do what he wants and punish those who do not agree with him, he also makes the US an expendable and powerless country in the world.

Except in the case of Project 2025, Trump is delivering on his promises.

The case of Project 2025 indicates that President Trump is lying through his teeth. He swore that he had ‘nothing to do’ with this 900-page conservative policy plan produced by the Heritage Foundation during the election campaign. During the election campaign he denied his connection with this project, because Democrats criticised his radical proposals that were also unpopular with voters.

However, when it comes to his policy plans he usually keeps his word. Thus, he is implementing reciprocal tariffs and disengagement from China, with a defence focus on the power struggle with his rival, a shift away from Europe and NATO, and an end to his conditional support for Ukraine. Trump was transparent about how he saw and wanted to exercise power during his second term. He even said he would be a ‘dictator from day one’, boasted of imposing exorbitant tariffs, promised to end the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza in a day without explaining how, while inciting racism, sexism and violence.

Despite these warning signs and the tie between Republicans and Democrats in the polls, on November 5, 2024, U.S. voters gave a clear victory to Donald Trump. His most radical supporters not only believed him, but also supported what he was proposing—yet they were not numerous enough to secure his win. He needed the votes of moderate Republicans and independents to return to the White House. It is precisely this group of people, who never fully believed in the Trump project, that is now surprised by the radical direction his presidency has taken and that now rejects him.

This is confirmed by a New York Times/Siena College poll published on April 25, 2025 (https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/25/us/politics/trump-poll-approval.html), which places his approval rating at 42%, the lowest of any president within the first hundred days in office, with one exception: his own first term (2017–2021). The poll suggests that his most loyal voters continue to support him and give him the benefit of the doubt, despite the chaos his policies have caused in both domestic and international markets. This group of loyalists still backs their president, even though there has been barely any relief in the inflation rate—one of his major campaign promises. Many of Trump’s most fervent supporters are people who were affected by the collapse of the manufacturing industry and the resulting loss of the state-provided jobs it once offered. In fact, neither Democrats nor Republicans have managed to address the problems faced by these angry voters—justifiably so—because they believe the system wasn’t working for them. That is why these Trump-supporting voters agree with the idea of blowing up the system that failed them, as their President proposes.

However, the moderate Republicans and independents—who were key to his election—are beginning to have regrets, as 54% of voters, according to the New York Times poll, disapprove of Trump’s performance in his first hundred days in office. This is a significant figure, because most U.S. presidents experience their first three months in office as a political “honeymoon,” with higher approval ratings from voters. This raises the question of why these voters believed that Trump’s bark would be worse than his bite—that is, that the President would govern more moderately than his campaign promises suggested.

A Trump II Without Checks and Balances

Many of the promises from Donald Trump’s first electoral victory in 2016 never materialized. However, a major difference between then and now is that none of the Republicans who curbed Trump’s worst impulses during his first administration—such as Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, or White House Chief of Staff John Kelly—are present this time around. Trump II is surrounded by subordinates who carry out his orders without question.

The same is true of a Republican-controlled Congress. During his first term, Trump occasionally had to contend with dissent from Republican senators like John McCain, Jeff Flake, or Susan Collins. For example, Senator Mitt Romney was the only Republican who voted to convict Trump in his first impeachment trial. Of that group, the only person still in the Senate is Susan Collins. In the House of Representatives, prominent opposition came from Justin Amash, Adam Kinzinger, Liz Cheney, and John Katko. None of them remain. Only the occasional complaint is heard from figures like Chip Roy and Thomas Massie.

In fact, both his team and the authors of Project 2025—who are close to Trump—support a constitutional interpretation called the “unitary executive theory,” which grants the president total control over the executive branch. In other words, if the president decides something, it is legal. This idea has existed since the founding of the United States and originates from Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Opponents argue that the unitary executive theory undermines the checks and balances system that the Constitution’s framers built into the U.S. political system. Trump has triggered a constitutional crisis, because granting such broad power to the Executive encourages abuses of power. The most blatant example was his refusal to repatriate Kilmar Abrego García from El Salvador to the United States, defying a Supreme Court order.

The root of this crisis was the expansion of presidential immunity granted by the Supreme Court in July 2024 to Donald Trump. It includes absolute immunity for core constitutional acts and a presumption of immunity for official acts not within the core constitutional powers. Only private conduct is excluded from immunity.

According to the New York Times/Siena College poll, “voters believe President Trump is overreaching with his aggressive strategy to expand executive power, and they have serious doubts about key parts of his agenda.” Sixty-six percent of respondents described Trump’s second term as “chaotic,” 59% called it “frightening,” and 42% labeled it “exciting.” Public opinion has also worsened with regard to Trump’s economic policies—which is significant, given that the economy and immigration were the two main pillars of his campaign. Furthermore, the poll showed that 64% of voters remembered the economy during his first term positively, while now, only 43% do.

Negative public opinion can serve as an important check on presidential power. Even though he shows no shame, Trump wants to be liked and popular. Moreover, public opinion indirectly affects other checks on power: Republicans in Congress are less likely to follow an unpopular Trump blindly. This gives Democrats hope of retaking one or both chambers in the 2026 midterm elections. Without a doubt, a Democratic electoral victory would be a significant counterweight during the second half of his administration and could turn him into a weak or “lame-duck” president.

Trump and Power

Donald Trump, supposedly the author of The Art of the Deal, brings neither art nor nuance to the negotiating table. Instead, everything revolves around a display of strength—what he would call “leverage”—as he launches threats such as steep tariffs even before bilateral talks begin. He enjoys humiliating others, as seen in his meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in January 2025, and he shows utter disdain for rules and laws.

Trump’s style is often described as transactional, but “punitive” would be more accurate. Time and again, we’ve seen his playbook: announce an exemplary punishment that can only be lifted if his demands are met. Tariffs are his favorite way to punish countries he dislikes or to pressure them into a “better deal.”

Trump believes that countries that sell more to the U.S. than they import from it are, in some way, cheating. He has held this mercantilist view of trade for decades, even though it is completely contrary to the traditional Republican doctrine of promoting more trade, lower tariffs, and open markets. It’s worth remembering that the last time the U.S. had a trade surplus was in 1975. Since then, it has been a consumption-driven economy that buys cheaper goods produced abroad.

So far, the Trump administration has used tariffs primarily as a tool to bring other countries to the negotiating table. But recently, we learned what his pain threshold is. April 2, 2025, was “Liberation Day,” when he announced a massive list of clumsy tariffs that looked as if they’d been written by artificial intelligence. A week later, on April 9, he declared a ninety-day pause, citing “nervous” citizens and markets. The only result of that big announcement was a faltering economy and furious voters who saw their retirement funds shrink.

Along with his belief that trade deficits are bad, Trump seems to think he can turn back time and remake the U.S. into a manufacturing economy. A viral video of overweight Americans performing tedious tasks—typically done by non-national labor—was shared widely on social media to mock this idea. Even the white working-class men who voted for Trump don’t seem to agree with this erratic policy.

Nonetheless, Trump’s theory is that tariffs, combined with a weak dollar, will bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. This vision ignores the fact that most job losses have been due to technology. Meanwhile, the U.S. still lacks enough engineers, and instead of finding ways to attract more students to engineering schools, the Trump administration is attacking universities and their research programs—as happened with the prestigious Harvard University.

As the President shows that the U.S. is an unreliable partner in security and trade, allies are beginning to diversify their foreign relations to stabilize their economies. Even if Democrats manage to win back the House or even the Senate in 2026 and weaken Trump’s grip on foreign policy, there is no guarantee that allies will trust the U.S. again as they did after President Bush with Barack Obama, or after Trump’s first term with Joe Biden.

Since Eisenhower, every U.S. president has urged Europe to increase defense spending to reduce dependency on the U.S. Trump has simply been much more belligerent about it. In his second term, with the war in Ukraine on the EU’s border, EU member states are finally taking their security and defense seriously. Strengthening autonomous European defense is positive for Europe and helps reduce the U.S. role as the “world’s policeman.” In theory, strategic autonomy could save U.S. taxpayers money by lowering the defense budget. However, Trump wants the opposite: to increase military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S.’s hard power—both economic and military—is declining. Economically, because traditional trade partners are seeking alternatives. Militarily, because the EU is already a global economic power and, with more military capacity, will carry more weight in hard power terms, making the U.S. less necessary as Europe’s security guarantor.

The Erosion of U.S. Soft Power

As Donald Trump boosts America’s hard power, he is simultaneously destroying what little soft power remains. Trump neither cares for nor understands soft power—the power of attraction. To him, everything boils down to pressure and to what resources or threats can be used to force the other actor to submit. It doesn’t matter whether it’s someone who was once loyal to him (e.g., his former Vice President Mike Pence) or long-standing allies like the European Union. More than achieving concrete goals, Trump seems to crave spectacle, displays of strength, and the raw exercise of hard power.

Foreign tourists are avoiding the U.S., and as the upcoming fall semester approaches, students are opting out of choosing American universities—not only because they can’t get a visa due to Trump’s restrictive immigration policies. The drop in tourism and academic exchange will have lasting effects on the global image and prestige of the United States. In this regard, it is significant that in Canada—the U.S.’s second-largest trading partner—liberal candidate Mark Carney won, against all odds, on an anti-Trump platform.

As time goes on, the U.S. presidency may find more capacity to tackle domestic problems, but it will also find it has less influence and appeal to achieve its goals globally. Becoming less dependent on an unstable U.S.—economically and in terms of security—might seem like a good thing for Europe and the world, but it will also come with costs, especially when it implies greater interdependence with illiberal partners like China. Many countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, are expanding trade and seeking investment from China. Increasingly, they are also purchasing Chinese military equipment, and we are seeing growing defense cooperation among Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries.

Let’s remember that Madeleine Albright once called the United States “the indispensable nation.” Under Trump II, the opposite seems to be happening: despite his hunger for power and desire for a strong America, his actions are making the country increasingly dispensable to the world—and therefore, less powerful.