BRICS confront Trump

Matias Mongan, Contributor to the Gate Center and Journalist

Since its first summit sixteen years ago, BRICS has become a powerful bloc: it represents 40% of the world’s population, 30% of the global economy, and 20% of international trade (Saccone 2025). On July 6 and 7, the BRICS group and its ten member states held their 17th Summit in Rio de Janeiro with notable absences: only six Presidents or Heads of State attended, while four sent substitutes—an unprecedented situation for a group that had until now appeared united at the highest level. In light of the absences and the internal differences, host Lula da Silva can still claim success for securing a Final Declaration.

U.S. Protectionism Takes Center Stage at the BRICS Summit

As the current rotating president of BRICS, Brazil aimed to produce a balanced final statement. For this reason, the document does not explicitly mention the United States or its President, who has threatened, among other things, to impose a 50% tariff on all Brazilian products. Nevertheless, it criticizes protectionist economic practices justified on geopolitical or environmental grounds, clearly alluding to the European Union (EU).

BRICS faces multiple challenges ahead: the need to strengthen cohesion following the 2024 expansion, and to deepen intra-bloc cooperation and trade within an increasingly “anarchic” international context, in which Trump seems determined to ramp up diplomatic pressure on the group to undermine China’s leadership. This could constrain BRICS’s international influence and its role as an advocate for Global South interests.

The Ministerial Meeting Before the Summit Reveals Internal Tensions

The expansion of BRICS¹ from five to ten members—varying in size, geography, and development level—was mainly driven by China (Gabuev and Stuenkel 2024), but it has highlighted growing difficulties in harmonizing positions among countries with at times conflicting interests, especially as BRICS decisions are made by consensus or unanimity.

A clear example was the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in Rio de Janeiro from April 28–29, which ended without a joint declaration due to Egypt and Ethiopia’s opposition to the bloc’s proposed reform of the United Nations Security Council. Both countries refused to support South Africa’s bid, arguing it violated the Ezulwini Consensus, adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2005, which calls for at least two permanent seats for African nations on the Security Council, without naming any specific country (AU, 2005). The new BRICS members even formally recorded their disagreement in the final declaration (MRE 2025), despite the removal of the reference to South Africa from the final text: “This marked a rare public rift in BRICS deliberations, on a subject as symbolic and politically sensitive as Security Council reform” (The Voice of Africa 2025).

If the member countries failed to reach consensus on a matter that has been on the BRICS agenda since its founding in 2009, it will be even more difficult to agree on issues such as the trade war initiated by Donald Trump. There are differing views on the role BRICS should play in this conflict. China and Russia, for instance, want to turn the group into a vehicle for their opposition to the West and the U.S.-led global order (Gabuev and Stuenkel 2024). This aim gained traction with the entry of Iran, a historic U.S. adversary that recently had a military skirmish with Washington.

Other countries—especially Brazil and India—prefer that BRICS work to democratize international organizations. From their perspective, this would promote greater multipolarity and allow Global South nations to negotiate from a better position with both China- and U.S.-led blocs: “This battle between anti-Western and non-aligned states will shape the future of BRICS, with major implications for the world order itself” (Gabuev and Stuenkel 2024).

As for the other recent entrants, Indonesia can be placed in the second group. At the Rio de Janeiro Summit, President Prabowo Subianto called on his peers to uphold the “Spirit of Bandung” (referring to the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia that founded the Non-Aligned Movement). A similar tone was adopted by Lula da Silva, who stated during the summit that BRICS is the political heir of that movement (Grippo 2025). Egypt and the United Arab Emirates also chose a pragmatic approach—Egypt to preserve its role as a “middle power” capable of fostering peace and security in the Middle East and Africa (EI 2025), and the UAE due to its commercial ties with the U.S. The only country aligning more closely with China appears to be Ethiopia, thanks to its increasing bilateral trade with Beijing (Zhou 2025).

Rejection of Unilateral Trade Policies Without Mentioning Trump

Unlike previous editions, the Rio Summit was marked by notable absences. Vladimir Putin participated virtually due to an active International Criminal Court arrest warrant. The Presidents of China, Egypt, and Iran also did not attend. The most significant absence was undoubtedly that of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who, for the first time since taking office in 2013, skipped the annual summit. He sent Prime Minister Li Qiang instead, who called for a unified response to unilateral trade practices: “Power politics and intimidation are never the right way to solve problems” (Xinhua 2025).

In contrast to China’s often confrontational rhetoric in its trade war with the U.S., the summit’s final declaration avoided polarization, in line with Brazil’s pro-tempore presidency approach. As Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira (2025) stated, BRICS is “not a bloc of confrontation,” but a coalition that promotes cooperation and development in the Global South.

The final statement not only criticizes the “indiscriminate increase of tariffs and non-tariff measures” that undermine the principles of the weakened World Trade Organization (WTO), but also denounces economic protectionism masked as environmental concern—aimed at the EU. In fact, more sections of the declaration (articles 85, 88, and 99) are devoted to criticizing this EU practice than to addressing U.S. trade policy. It argues that climate change policies—such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms and deforestation regulations—should not “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade” (BRICS, 2025: 27). By the end of 2025, the EU will implement a regulation (EU, 2023) allowing only products that are free from deforestation or forest degradation to enter its market (EUR-Lex 2025). Seven commodities—cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soy, and timber—are affected, significantly impacting exports from some BRICS countries, such as Brazil, where soybeans account for 15.2% of total exports (OEC, 2025).

Avoiding Deep Dives into Armed Conflicts

The final declaration also avoids delving into major military conflicts, as some BRICS members are directly involved (e.g., Russia and Iran). Regarding the war in Ukraine, BRICS emphasized the importance of mediation efforts, such as the African Peace Initiative and the Group of Friends for Peace, aimed at a diplomatic resolution. The U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure were deemed violations of international law and the UN Charter, though Trump’s administration was not explicitly mentioned to avoid potential retaliation. The conflict that received the most attention was the war in Gaza. BRICS condemned Israel’s obstruction of humanitarian aid and its violations of human rights, including the use of “hunger” as a weapon of war. The term “genocide” was not included in the official declaration, although Lula da Silva used it in his opening speech to describe the military actions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Gaza (Gosman 2025).

Finally, the group acknowledged the challenge of maintaining internal cohesion after welcoming five new members and dealing with a broader agenda: “We recognize that the expansion of BRICS membership and agenda requires adjustments in the group’s working methods… We support improving existing practices to ensure BRICS remains effective, efficient, responsive, inclusive, and consensus-based” (BRICS 2025).

Main Challenges Ahead

Lula da Silva’s key achievement was reaching a consensus, avoiding the negative outcome of the April ministerial meeting—especially given the absences that weakened the Rio Summit’s political impact. Still, claiming the Summit was a failure due to Xi Jinping’s absence would be an exaggeration. Though China plays a leading role in BRICS, countries like Brazil and India have emerged as counterweights, challenging China’s narrative control over the bloc. The next presidential summit will be held in India, ensuring continuity of the “pragmatic” approach adopted under Brazil’s leadership.

Looking ahead, the group’s main challenge is to strengthen internal cohesion and adopt concrete measures to align the often divergent interests of member countries. This would better prepare the bloc to face tariff assaults from President Trump, who sees BRICS as an enemy of the West and increases diplomatic pressure to weaken its appeal in the Global South and undercut China’s leadership. As is typical of his blunt foreign policy, Trump’s measures make no distinction between the more anti-Western governments (like China, Russia, and Iran) and those seeking to act as bridges between the Global North and South, such as the traditional BRICS members—Brazil, India, and South Africa—or the newer entrants like Egypt, the UAE, and Indonesia.

Trump’s hostile stance could radicalize the discourse of this second group, which—despite some foreign policy differences—agrees with the first on the need to build a multipolar international system and reform global institutions. This scenario would undoubtedly increase geopolitical tensions and deepen the crisis of multilateralism, which Lula da Silva, at the Rio Summit, described as facing an “unprecedented collapse.”

[1] Between 2024 and 2025, five full members have joined BRICS: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia. Saudi Arabia participates in the Summits but has not formalized its membership.