Cuba between Two Blockades: The Impact of the Helms–Burton Act Inside and Outside the Island

Alexis Berg-Rodríguez, Professor of Public International Law and International Relations, Carlos III University of Madrid

Carlos III University of Madrid

On March 12, 2026, thirty years marked since the enactment of the Helms–Burton Act in the United States, legislation that codified the economic and political embargo against Cuba and reinforced its extraterritorial character by expanding sanctions to foreign companies and actors maintaining economic relations with the Island. Since the end of the Cold War, the use of U.S. foreign policy instruments—especially economic sanctions—has been conceived as a political means of pressure to promote democratization processes in countries of the former socialist bloc. However, the results of these policies have been limited.

The Cuban case is particularly illustrative. According to the United States, since 1960 U.S. policy toward Cuba has been explicitly aimed at provoking the “internal erosion of the Cuban political project through scarcity and the deterioration of living conditions and the discontent derived from economic dissatisfaction and hardship; weakening Cuba’s economic life; applying policies aimed at depriving the country of financial resources and supplies; reducing nominal and real wages; and thereby provoking hunger, desperation, and ultimately inducing the overthrow of the Cuban government”¹. Despite the Cuban population having endured this situation for 60 years, the political objectives of this strategy have not been achieved, yet they continue to subject the Cuban people to enormous suffering. This highlights the structural limits and the real scope of a prolonged coercive policy.

Domestically, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel has stated that “the economic battle therefore consists of generating a more proactive, intelligent, and concrete attitude among leaders, who are called upon to promote—rather than hinder or delay—reliable and specific solutions; and to strengthen structures and teams responsible for economic management”². The reference to internal obstacles and delays has been characterized as an internal blockade, insofar as they limit the implementation of changes and transformations approved at the Congresses of the Communist Party of Cuba and that depend exclusively on the government.

Economic, financial, and health impacts of sanctions

Through sanctions applied by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the United States demonstrates the extraterritorial and systemic nature of the embargo by targeting foreign companies that trade and cooperate with Cuba. It also prevents the emergence of free competition between foreign and U.S. companies. This hypothesis gains strength when observing that, under humanitarian provisions, since 2002 the United States has become the main supplier of food and agricultural products to Cuba, with exports rising exponentially from over $4 million in 2001 to $400 million in 2025³. Meanwhile, medical and pharmaceutical exports to Cuba increased from nearly $5 million in 2015 to $140 million in 2025⁴.

These figures confirm that the United States seeks primacy and an exclusive monopoly in providing the services and supplies Cuba needs for its economy and infrastructure. Echoing the popular Cuban phrase, “No one else touches anything; only I can,” this positioning ensures Cuba’s economic dependency through this relationship while punishing any company or country that attempts to trade with the Island. This approach effectively extends to Latin America and the Caribbean as well.

Another element to consider is that the embargo has also functioned as a mechanism benefiting certain sectors of power in both countries. Its persistence has favored economic and political groups in Cuba and the United States, for whom confrontation constitutes a space for political legitimization and economic profitability.

In general terms, according to official Cuban figures, the economic damage caused by the embargo up to 2025 “exceeds $2 trillion”⁵. In this context, it is not surprising that such actors have opposed the process of diplomatic détente and bilateral economic opening initiated during the administration of Barack Obama (2009–2017), as well as the limited opportunities offered by international agreements with third countries. All of this has formed a perfect storm contributing to rising social unrest, expressed in protests and growing tensions, further aggravated by the tightening of the U.S. energy blockade against Cuban society in 2026.

Recent tightening of the embargo: the energy and extraterritorial dimension

The administration of Donald Trump has intensified pressure on Cuba through a strategy of energy asphyxiation with extraterritorial reach, formalized in the Executive Order of January 29, 2026. This measure declares a “national emergency” based on the alleged—and debated—designation of Cuba as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security⁶. Within this securitization framework, Cuba becomes one element among others. Based on this premise, punitive tariffs and secondary sanctions are imposed on any state, company, or shipping firm involved in exporting fuel to the Island.

However, in an apparently contradictory move, President Trump himself “authorized the entry into a Cuban port of the Russian oil tanker Anatoly Kolodkin, which unloaded around 100,000 tons of crude at the Matanzas terminal for humanitarian purposes”⁷. The exceptional nature of this authorization, and the possibility that it may be repeated, raises questions about how the Trump administration manages control and humanitarian aid as a means of progressively influencing the weakening of infrastructure and the suffering of Cuban society (both on and off the Island), supported by geopolitical alliances shaped around contemporary conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war.

This further reinforces the instrumental nature of the embargo within Washington’s global strategy. Meanwhile, the Cuban government has had to decide which sectors to prioritize for energy allocation: “emergency electricity generation, public transport, agricultural machinery, or railways,” all critical sectors for maintaining minimal economic functioning and mitigating, even temporarily, the severe energy crisis.

Perspectives and future scenarios under the Trump–Rubio administration

In this historical context, the threats made by President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, along with observed patterns of behavior in this administration, suggest—analytically—a high probability of a U.S. armed intervention against Cuba. This scenario cannot be ruled out even if both parties formally maintain open diplomatic channels.

If Trump chooses not to intervene militarily, economic and energy pressures and sanctions would likely intensify in an attempt to provoke internal conflict on the Island. Otherwise, a direct intervention could take place in the months leading up to the midterm legislative elections scheduled for November 2026. The primary objective would be to secure a new political achievement to offset potential negative perceptions from military involvement in Iran, thereby mobilizing an electoral base concentrated in key swing states, including the 29 votes influenced by the anti-Castro sector in Florida.

However, a YouGov poll shows that “61% of the U.S. population opposes using military force to attack Cuba, while 57% opposes overthrowing the Cuban government.” Only “13% would support an attack, and 18% would support the use of military force to overthrow it”⁸. Despite this, the policy can be interpreted as a contemporary reformulation of the Monroe Doctrine, once again viewing Latin America and the Caribbean as an exclusive U.S. sphere of influence—its “backyard”⁹.

At the same time, ongoing negotiations mediated by the Vatican may be exploring formulas aimed at a potential regime change characterized by moderate political flexibility. In this regard, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has repeatedly argued that “Cuba needs two things: economic reform and political reform,” emphasizing that deep economic transformation is unviable without changes to the system of governance¹⁰. Since Cuba was explicitly incorporated as a new “project” within Trump’s presidential agenda, Rubio has been projected as a central figure in this strategy.

In an initial phase marked by exchanges of statements, threats, intimidation, and diplomatic pressure, the Secretary of State could assume direct leadership of negotiations on behalf of the United States. In a second phase, it is not unlikely that these efforts could involve members of President Trump’s inner family circle, following a pattern similar to that observed in the 2025 agreement between Israel and Hamas. A successful outcome would strengthen Trump’s electoral position in swing states and simultaneously serve as a significant political asset for a future presidential candidacy by Marco Rubio.

A peaceful agreement with the Cuban government could also be positively received by certain sectors of U.S. civil society, given the symbolic value that Cuba represents as an emblem of resistance to U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as among broad segments of the international community.

Nevertheless, recent statements by Díaz-Canel and Marco Rubio suggest that the path of dialogue is seriously deteriorated, or that no common ground has been identified to structure an effective negotiation agenda. This is despite partial progress on the Island, such as the gradual release of more than 2,000 political prisoners¹¹, as well as the formal recognition, in the 2019 Cuban Constitution, of freedoms of expression and association—later restricted following the 2021 protests, including limitations on access to and use of the internet.

In any case, the Cuban population continues to suffer as a direct victim of the embargo’s effects, while the Cuban government pursues a controlled opening of its economy and foreign policy to private enterprises, allowing investment by Cubans residing abroad. Meanwhile, both sides have acknowledged that a negotiation process is underway. In an interview with Canal Red on March 25, 2026, Díaz-Canel outlined core conditions: respect for sovereignty, equality between parties, fairness, no preconditions for dialogue, and non-interference in internal affairs.

At a second level, discussions could address the gradual liberalization of the Cuban economy aimed at facilitating U.S. investment under preferential conditions; direct participation of U.S. companies in strategic sectors; and the creation of compensation mechanisms for Cuban-American entrepreneurs who can demonstrate the nationalization of their assets after 1959.

These elements would be accompanied by issues related to migration, human rights, the fight against drug trafficking, regional security, and the environment. These demands intersect with longstanding claims, such as the return of the territory occupied by the Guantánamo naval base and compensation for damages resulting from more than six decades of economic embargo. The ongoing negotiation process between the two neighbors does not guarantee a change in Trump’s foreign policy toward Cuba, given its unpredictability. It could shift dramatically—toward invasion, increased sanctions, or even a call to lift the embargo by leveraging a congressional majority—though the latter remains the least likely scenario.

[1] Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory, U.S. Department of State, No. 499, declassified in 1991. In: Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1991. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d499

[2] CIBERCUBA, Miguel Díaz-Canel mentions the “internal blockade” in Cuba for the first time, June 18, 2019. https://www.cibercuba.com/noticias/2019-06-18-u1-e199291-s27061-miguel-diaz

[3] U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., Economic Eye on Cuba, December 2025. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/563a4585e4b00d0211e8dd7e/t/69611

[4] Ibid.

[5] “For submission to UN General Assembly Resolution 79/7, ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.’” May 2025.https://misiones.cubaminrex.cu/es/articulo/informe-de-cuba-en-virtud-de-la-resolucion-797-de-la-asamblea-general-de-las-naciones

[6] King, M. “Trump’s blockade against Cuba reaches unprecedented levels in 2026.” Prensa Latina, April 1, 2026. Available at: https://publica.prensa-latina.cu/pub/bloqueo-de-trump-contra-cuba-alcanza

[7] BBC News Mundo. “A Russian oil tanker arrives in Cuba with Trump’s authorization amid the U.S. blockade of the island.” March 30, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c0mj94nr04eo

[8] YouGov, “More Americans disapprove than approve of the U.S. blocking oil shipments to Cuba and the U.S. embargo.” March 16, 2026. https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/54332-more-americans-disapprove-than-approve-of-the-us-blocking-oil-shipments-to-cuba-and-the-us-embargo

[9] BBC, “How Trump’s radical shift in U.S. foreign policy worries Europe (and what it says about his intentions in Latin America).” Available at: https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c62vdzpzrego

[10] Cuba en Miami, “Explosive exchange between the U.S. and Cuba: what Marco Rubio said about Díaz-Canel’s war warnings.” April 7, 2026. Available at: https://www.cubaenmiami.com/cruce-explosivo-entre

[11] CNN, “The Cuban government will release 2,010 prisoners in the largest such release in years, it announced Thursday, as the island faces increasing pressure from the Trump administration.” Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/02/americas/cuba-prisoner